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Abstract
Structured utility models are essential for the effec-
tive representation and elicitation of complex multiat-
tribute utility functions. Generalized additive indepen-
dence (GAI) models provide an attractive structural
model of user preferences, offering a balanced tradeoff
between simplicity and applicability. While represen-
tation and inference with such models is reasonably
well understood, elicitation of the parameters of such
models has been studied less from a practical perspec-
tive. We propose a procedure to elicit GAI model pa-
rameters using only “local” utility queries rather than
“global” queries over full outcomes. Our local queries
take full advantage of GAI structure and provide a
sound framework for extending the elicitation proce-
dure to settings where the uncertainty over utility pa-
rameters is represented probabilistically. We describe
experiments using a myopic value-of-information ap-
proach to elicitation in a large GAI model.
1 Introduction
The increased interest in automated decision support tools
in recent years has brought the problem of automated pref-
erence elicitation to the forefront of research in decision
analysis [7, 15, 12] and AI [5, 6, 2]. Generally speaking,
the goal of automated preference elicitation is to devise
algorithmic approaches that will guide a user through an
appropriate sequence of queries or interactions and deter-
mine enough about her preferences to make a good or opti-
mal decision. Many models have been proposed, including
those that treat responses to queries as constraints on utili-
ties (including methods in conjoint analysis [13]) and those
that use priors over utility parameters.
Crucial to preference elicitation in complex domains is the
existence of utility function structure [11, 8]. Structure in
the form of additive, multilinear, generalized additive or
other models [11, 8, 1, 3] can be used to represent utility
models very concisely. While additive models are by far
the most commonly used in practice, generalized additive
independence (GAI) models [8, 1, 10] have drawn more at-
tention recently because of their additional flexibility. Un-
fortunately, effective elicitation procedures for GAI mod-
els have attracted far less attention than additive models.
Thus, for example, recent procedures for eliciting parame-
ters of GAI models often ignore the semantic foundations
of direct queries [4]. Gonzales and Perny [10] recently ad-
dressed this problem. Using the semantic foundations of
Fishburn [8] they discuss a graphical model which can be
used to guide elicitation in GAI models.
In this paper, we continue the exploration of elicitation
of GAI utility model parameters. One difficulty with the
procedure of Gonzales and Perny [10] is its reliance on
standard gamble queries involving full outcomes. In large,
multiattribute domains, it can be cognitively unmanageable
for a user to compare full outcomes involving more than
a handful of attributes; furthermore, this fails to take ad-
vantage of the independence structure in the queries them-
selves. We propose a new elicitation technique that allows
the parameters of a GAI model to be determined using (al-
most exclusively) “local” queries over a small number of
attributes, while respecting the Fishburn semantics.
Our second contribution is a procedure for partial elicita-
tion of utility parameters. Generally speaking, good (or
even optimal) decisions can be realized without complete
utility information. Rather than asking for the direct as-
sessment of utility parameters using standard gambles as
in [10], we consider simpler binary comparison queries
over gambles. Following [6, 2], we suppose some prior
over the parameters of a GAI model, and use myopic ex-
pected value of information (EVOI) to determine appropri-
ate queries. The advantages of GAI models become very
clear in such a setting, since the implied decomposition al-
lows us to effectively compute EVOI in very large mod-
els. We demonstrate our procedure on a large (26 variable)
constraint-based configuration problem, showing that it is
fast enough to support interactive elicitation.
2 GAI Models
We begin with some standard concepts from multiattribute
utility theory [11, 8].
2.1 Background and Notation
Assume a set of attributes X1; X2; : : : ; Xn, each with fi-
nite domains (for ease of notation we use Xi to refer to
its domain as well). These define a set of outcomes (or
alternatives or consequences) X = X1      Xn over
which a decision maker (DM) has preferences. A prefer-
ence relation is a total preorder over the set of outcomes,
with x  x0 meaning that x is at least as preferred as x0.
Strict preference  and indifference  are defined in the
usual way. Given an index set I  f1; : : : ; ng, we define
XI = i2IXi to be the set of partial outcomes restricted
to attributes in I , and xI to be the same restriction of a
specific outcome x. IC denotes I’s complement.
User preferences can be expressed by a bounded, real-
valued utility function u : X 7! R such that u(x)  u(x0)
iff x  x0. A utility function serves as a quantitative rep-
resentation of strength of preferences, and can be used to
represent preferences over lotteries (distributions over out-
comes); specifically, one lottery is preferred to another iff
its expected utility is greater [14]. Let hp1;x1; : : : ; pk;xki
denote a lottery over k outcomes with xi realized with
probability pi (and
P
i pi = 1). Since utility functions
corresponding to  are unique only up to positive affine
transformation, it is customary to set the utility of the best
outcome x> to 1, and the utility of the worst outcome x? to
0. Thus, if a DM is indifferent between x and the standard
gamble hp;x>; 1− p;x?i, then u(x) = p.
2.2 Additive Independence
Since the number of outcomes is exponential in the num-
ber of attributes, specifying the utility of each outcome is
infeasible in most practical applications. However, u can
be expressed concisely if it exhibits sufficient structure.
Additive independence [11] is one structural assumption
commonly used in practice. Under a strong independence
assumption—specifically, that the DM is indifferent among
lotteries that have same marginals on each attribute—u can
be written as a sum of single-attribute subutility functions:
u(x) =
nX
i=1
ui(xi) =
nX
i=1
ivi(xi):
This simple factorization exploits subutility functions
ui(xi) = ivi(xi), which themselves depend on local
value functions vi and scaling constants i. The assumed
utility independence among attributes allows elicitation to
proceed locally: specifically, the vi can be elicited inde-
pendently of other attribute values. Since each attribute is
utility independent, each attribute’s best and worst levels
can be determined separately. Formally, x>i 2 Xi is Xi’s
best attribute level if and only if
(x>i ;y)  (xki ;y) 8xki 2 Xi;y 2 XiC .
The worst level x?i is defined similarly. A local preference
between xki and a local gamble hp; x>i ; 1 − p; x?i i is well-
defined since utility independence implies that (xki ;y) 
hp; (x>i ;y); 1−p; (x?i ;y)i for some y 2 XiC iff this holds
for all such y. Indifference for a specific p implies that
u(xki ;y) = p u(x
>
i ;y) + (1− p)u(x?i ;y),
and therefore, because of the additive form u,
vi(xki ) = p vi(x
>
i ) + (1− p) vi(x?i ).
If we set vi(x>i ) = 1, vi(x?i ) = 0, then vi(xki ) = p. Local
value functions vi() can be therefore elicited using only
local standard gamble queries that involve two local “an-
chor” outcomes x>i and x?i .
After performing local elicitation, we know each attribute’s
local value relative to the utilities of the respective anchor
outcomes. What remains is to bring all the local value
scales to the common global utility scale. To achieve global
consistency, queries involving full outcomes are unavoid-
able. Essentially, we need to find the true utility of all “an-
chor” outcomes x>i and x?i , with respect to some default
outcome x0. It is customary to choose the worst outcome
as default outcome, and set its utility to 0. Then, eliciting
u>i  ui(x>) = u(x>i ;x0iC );
u?i  ui(x?) = u(x?i ;x0iC ) = 0
for all attributes ensures consistent scaling of subutility
functions. Scaling factors i, which reflect attribute con-
tributions to the overall utility function, are simply u>i .
2.3 Generalized Additive Independence
GAI models [8, 1] provide an additive decomposition of
utility functions in situations where single attributes are not
additively independent, but (possibly nondisjoint) subsets
of attributes are. The form of a GAI model is as follows.
Assume a collection fI1; : : : ; Img of (possibly intersect-
ing) index sets such that [iIi = f1; : : : ; ng and local subu-
tility functions ui over XIi . Then u is decomposed as:
u(x) = u1(xI1 ) + : : : + um(xIm ):
If, say, I1 = f1; 2g, and I2 = f2; 3g in a three-attribute
domain, then u(x1; x2; x3) = u1(x1; x2) + u2(x2; x3).
We discuss the foundations of GAI models below, but first
illustrate difficulties with generalizing local elicitation of
the type suitable for additive models to GAI models [10].
In the additive case, ui(x1i ) > ui(x2i ) implies that out-
comes with ith attribute set to x1i are preferred to outcomes
with x2i , as long as the rest of attributes are kept constant.
However, in GAI models we cannot draw such straightfor-
ward conclusions. Let’s take our example u(x1; x2; x3) =
u1(x1; x2) + u2(x2; x3). If we know that u1(x11; x12) = 10
and u1(x11; x22) = 5, does it imply (x11; x12)  (x11; x22), ce-
teris paribus? It turns out that because of interdependence
of subutility factors, we can rewrite the utility function as
follows (f(x2) is an arbitrary real-valued function):
u(x1; x2; x3)
= [u1(x1; x2) + f(x2)] + [u2(x2; x3)− f(x2)]
= u01(x1; x2) + u
0
2(x2; x3):
If f(x12) = −5, and f(x22) = 5, then u01(x11; x12) = 5 and
u01(x
1
1; x
2
2) = 10, the exact opposite of u1(). Since the util-
ity can “flow” from one subutility factor to the next through
the shared attributes, the subutility values do not have an in-
dependent semantic meaning. This example illustrates that
the same utility function can be decomposed in an infinite
number of non-trivial ways.
The conditions under which a GAI model provides an ac-
curate representation of a utility function were defined by
Fishburn [8, 9], who introduced the model.1 Let P be the
set of all gambles (probability distributions) on X, and PI
be the set of all gambles on XI . For P 2 P , PI is the
marginal gamble of P over XI . Let fI1; : : : ; Img be a col-
lection of nonempty subsets of f1; : : : ; ng.
Defn. 1. The sets of attributes indexed by I1; : : : ; Im are
(generalized) additively independent if and only if
[(PI1 ; : : : ; PIm) = (QI1 ; : : : ; QIm)] =) P  Q;
that is, if and only if the decision maker is indifferent be-
tween two lotteries whenever their marginal distributions
on XI1 ; : : : ;XIm are the same.
Theorem 1. [8] The GAI condition holds iff there are real-
valued subutility functions u1; : : : ; um on XI1 ; : : : ;XIm
such that
u(x) = u1(xI1 ) + : : : + um(xIm ): (1)
The following important result relies on the notion of a de-
fault outcome, denoted by x0 = (x01; x02; : : : ; x0n) (where
each xi is set to an arbitrary value). For any x, let x[I] be
the outcome where attributes not in I are set to the default
value, but other attributes remain as in x (i.e., Xi = xi if
i 2 I , and Xi = x0i if i =2 I). For example, if x = (x1; x2),
then x[f1g] = (x1; x02).
Theorem 2. [8] If GAI holds, then for all x 2 X:
u(x) =
mX
j=1
(−1)j+1
X
1i1<i2<<ijm
u
 
x
"
j\
s=1
Iis
#!
: (2)
This theorem captures all dependencies intrinsic to GAI
utility functions. In our running example,
2[ex] u(x1; x2; x3) = u(x1; x2; x03) + u(x01; x2; x3) −
u(x01; x2; x
0
3):
1Fishburn used the term interdependent value additivity; Bac-
chus and Grove [1] dubbed the same concept GAI, which seems
to be more commonly used in the AI literature currently.
Given three arbitrary attribute sets I1; I2; I3, we have:
u(x) = u(x[I1]) + u(x[I2]) + u(x[I3])
− u(x[I1 \ I2])− u(x[I1 \ I3]) − u(x[I2 \ I3])
+ u(x([I1 \ I2 \ I3]):
As we can see, under GAI conditions, Theorem 2 provides
a way to write the utility of any outcome x as a sum of
utilities of certain other key outcomes. These outcomes are
related to x in a specific way: in each of them, some at-
tributes are set to the same levels as in outcome x, while
remaining attributes are at their default values.
Theorem 2 allows one to construct the subutility functions
required in Eq. 1. If we group the addends on the right side
of Eq. 2 appropriately, we can define u1; : : : ; um such that
u(x) =
Pm
j=1 uj(xIj ). There is, however, more than one
way to define these subutility functions. Let xj denote xIj
(the restriction of x to attributes in Ij ). Fishburn [8] pro-
posed the following construction for subutility functions:
u1(x1) = u(x[I1]); (3)
uj(xj) = u(x[Ij ]) +
j−1X
k=1
(−1)k
X
1i1<<ik<j
u(x[
k\
s=1
Iis \ Ij ]):
We call this the canonical subutility decomposition. In our
trivial example, the canonical decomposition would be:
u1(x1; x2) = u(x1; x2; x03)  u(x[I1]);
u2(x2; x3) = u(x01; x2; x3)− u(x01; x2; x03)
= u(x[I2])− u(x[I1 \ I2]):
In the case of three overlapping attribute sets I1; I2; I3:,
u1(x1) = u(x[I1]);
u2(x2) = u(x[I2])− u(x[I1 \ I2]);
u3(x3) = u(x[I3])− (u(x[I1 \ I3]) + u(x[I2 \ I3]))
+ u(x[I1 \ I2 \ I3]):
Recall that u() denotes utility of full outcomes, whereas
ui() is defined over attributes indexed by Ii.
3 GAI Elicitation with Local Queries
If we could easily elicit utilities of key outcomes, the elic-
itation task would be straightforward: the utility of any x
can be calculated using the utilities of related key outcomes
via Eq. 2. This simplifies elicitation because the decision
maker only has to specify utilities of key outcomes (see
[10] for a relevant elicitation algorithm). Unfortunately,
even key outcomes are “full” outcomes over all attributes;
it is unrealistic to expect a user to assess tradeoffs involving
full outcomes in domains with more than a few attributes.
Therefore, just as in the elicitation of additive utility func-
tions, we would like to separate the elicitation process into
local elicitation and global scaling.
3.1 Local Elicitation
Assume that for each subset Ii we have chosen two dif-
ferent “top” and “bottom” anchor outcomes x[Ii]> =
(x>Ii ;x
0
ICi
) and x[Ii]? = (x?Ii ;x
0
ICi
).2 In these outcomes,
the attributes indexed by the set Ii are set to their “top” and
“bottom” levels, respectively, while the other attributes are
set to the default level. We will assume that x[Ii]> is the
best possible outcome and x[Ii]? is the worst possible out-
come given that attributes not in Ii are set to the default
level; however, in general, this does not have to be the case
as long as top and bottom anchor outcomes are different.
Assuming these two anchor levels for each subset Ii, we
can express the utility of certain outcomes in terms of an-
chor outcome utilities in a local way. First, we define Mj
to be the union of all the subsets that have variable j:
Mj =
[
i:j2Ii
Ii:
We can think of Mj as the neighbor set of the attribute
j; it includes all the attributes that share subsets with the
attribute j. Then, the conditioning set Ci of the set Ii is
just the union of the neighbor sets of the attributes in Ii
minus the attributes in Ii:
Ci =
[
j2Ii
Mj − Ii:
For example, let u(x1; : : : ; x7) = u1(x1; x2; x3; x6) +
u2(x1; x2; x7)+u3(x2; x4)+u4(x4; x5)+u5(x5; x6) (see
Fig. 1). Then, the neighbor set of x4 is M4 = f2; 5g and
the conditioning set for I4 is C4 = f2; 6g.
After appropriate rearrangement of indices, an outcome x
can be written as (xi;xCi ;y), where y are the attributes
that are neither in Ii nor Ci. If the attributes in the condi-
tioning set are at default level, then we have the following:
Theorem 3. Under GAI conditions, if
(xi;x
0
Ci ;y)  hp; (x>i ;x0Ci ;y); 1− p; (x?i ;x0Ci ;y)i; then
(xi;x
0
Ci ;y
0)  hp; (x>i ;x0Ci ;y0); 1− p; (x?i ;x0Ci ;y0)i;
for any y0. Therefore,
(xi;x0Ci)  hp; (x>i ;x0Ci); 1− p; (x?i ;x0Ci)i:
That is, as long as attributes in the conditioning set of Ii are
fixed, the remaining attributes do not influence the strength
of preference of local outcomes xi. Thus, we can perform
local elicitation with respect to local anchors x>i and x?i ,
without specifying the levels of the y attributes.
Proof Given collection of subsets fI1; : : : ; Img, let Ci be
a partition of this collection such that Ci contains all Ij that
2It is important to keep in mind that anchor levels are defined
for each subutility factor, not individual attributes.
share some attribute with Ii: Ci = fIj : Ij \ Ii 6= ;g. All
subsets in Ci contain only variables in Ii and Ci. Thus, if
(xi;x0Ci ;y)  hp; (x>i ;x0Ci ;y); 1 − p; (x?i ;x0Ci ;y)i;
then
u(xi;x
0
Ci
;y) = pu(x>i ;x
0
Ci
;y) + (1− p)u(x?i ;x0Ci ;y)
=)
=
X
Ij2Ci
uj(xj [Ii]) +
X
Ij =2Ci
uj(yj) =
X
Ij =2Ci
uj(yj)+
=
2
4p X
Ij2Ci
uj(x
>
j [Ii]) + (1− p)
X
Ij2Ci
uj(x
?
j [Ii])
3
5
=)X
Ij2Ci
uj(xj [Ii]) =
p
X
Ij2Ci
uj(x
>
j [Ii]) + (1− p)
X
Ij2Ci
uj(x
?
j [Ii]) =)
(xi;x
0
Ci)  hp; (x>i ;x0Ci); 1− p; (x?i ;x0Ci)i: 
Thus, the utility of any suboutcome xi of factor i can be
expressed locally in terms of the two anchor levels, given
that attributes in the conditioning set of i are set to their
default values. We can now define a local value function
vi() such that vi(x>i ) = 1, vi(x?i ) = 0, and vi(xi) = p iff
(xi;x0Ci)  hp; (x>i ;x0Ci); 1− p; (x?i ;x0Ci)i:
We can calibrate the relative values of vi(xi) within any
subutility factor (conditional on Ci at default levels) using
only queries over attributes in Ii and Ci.3 This stands in
contrast to the elicitation procedure of [10] which uses full
outcomes. After local elicitation, we know the conditional
local values vi() for all settings of attributes in Ii.
3.2 Global scaling
Suppose we have elicited the local value functions vi and
the utilities of anchor outcomes x[Ii]> and x[Ii]? (re-
call that anchor outcomes are full outcomes). Let u>i =
u(x[Ii]>) and u?i = u(x[Ii]?). The utility of an arbitrary
outcome x can now be calculated from the utilities of an-
chor outcomes and local value functions. By the definition
of local value functions (assuming vi(xi) = p),
(xi;x0Ci ;y
0)  hp; (x>i ;x0Ci ;y0); 1− p; (x?i ;x0Ci ;y0)i;
(xi;x0Ci ;y
0)  hvi(xi); x[Ii]>; 1− vi(xi); x[Ii]?i:
Therefore, for any Ji  Ii,
u(x[Ji]) = vi(xi[Ji]) u>i + (1 − vi(xi[Ji])) u?i
= (u>i − u?i ) vi(xi[Ji]) + u?i :
3It is important to distinguish local value functions (which are
only locally calibrated) from the GAI subutility functions ui, even
though both are defined over the same factors.
Finally, we define the subutility functions u1; : : : ; um in
terms of anchor outcome utilities and local value functions.
Using the canonical definition (Eq. 3), we get
u1(x1) = (u
>
1 − u?1 ) v1(x1) + u?1 ; (4)
uj(xj) = (u
>
j − u?j ) 2
4vj(xj) + j−1X
k=1
(−1)k
X
1i1<<ik<j
vj(xj [
k\
s=1
Iis \ Ij ])
3
5
+
2
4u?j + j−1X
k=1
(−1)k
X
1i1<<ik<j
u?j
3
5 :
In our small example, this gives:
u1(x1; x2) = (u>1 − u?1 ) v1(x1; x2) + u?1 ;
u2(x2; x3) = (u>2 − u?2 ) [v2(x2; x3)− v2(x2; x03)]:
3.3 Graphical Elicitation Procedure
In practice, we expect GAI models to exhibit considerable
structure, and intersections between subutility factors to in-
volve only a few variables. We propose a complete util-
ity elicitation procedure that takes advantage of such struc-
ture. For now, we assume that a decision maker is capable
of answering direct local standard gamble utility queries,
such as “for what probability p would you be indiffer-
ent between suboutcome xi and a (local) standard lottery
hp;x>i ; 1 − p;x?i i, assuming that attributes in the condi-
tioning set Ci are at default levels?” Later, we will consider
more realistic local comparison queries.
Assume a decomposition of attributes into GAI subsets
I1; : : : ; Im, and fix an order over these subsets (the order
does not affect efficiency of our algorithm). We construct
a directed graph whose nodes correspond to the sets Ii and
directed edges (Ii; Ij) whenever Ii \ Ij 6= ; and i > j.4
Edge (Ii; Ij) is labeled by Ii\Ij . Fig. 1 shows an example
of a GAI graph.
After local elicitation, we have local value functions vi().
Utilities of anchor levels u>1 ; u?1 ; : : : ; u>m; u?m have to be
obtained by global queries. However, we only need to
ask 2m such queries involving full outcomes.5 Interest-
ingly, this is the same number of global queries required
for global scaling in the linearly additive case (considering
each attribute as a factor in the additive case).
The general formula for defining canonical subutility func-
tions is provided by Eq. 4. However, we can simplify it
considerably due to the graphical structure of GAI attribute
sets. A utility function u0 is strategically equivalent to u
if u0 is a positive affine transformation of u. Notice that
the expression u?j +
Pj−1
k=1(−1)k
P
u?j on the last line
in Eq. 4 does not depend on the particular configuration
xj . Therefore, it is simply a constant and can be elimi-
nated. Furthermore, when
Tk
s=1 Iis \ Ij = ;, we have
4An undirected version of this graph is a GAI network [10].
5Only m queries are required if x0 = x?.
1 2 7
2 4
4 5
5 6
1 2
4
5
2
6
1 2 3 6 2
I
I
I
I
I
1
2
5
4
3
Figure 1: An Example of a GAI Graph.
vj(xj [
Tk
s=1 Iis \ Ij ]) = vj(xj [;]) = vj(x0j ), i.e., the lo-
cal utility of the default suboutcome. This utility is fixed at
(u(x0)−u?j )=(u>j −u?j ), and does not depend on the argu-
ment xj ; therefore, every vj(xj [
Tk
s=1 Iis \ Ij ]) for whichTk
s=1 Iis \ Ij = ; can be eliminated from Eq. 4.
Any utility function u can now be rewritten as a strategi-
cally equivalent utility function u0:
u0(x) =
mX
j=1
u0j(xj) =
mX
j=1
vj(xj)(u
>
j − u?j ); (5)
where
vj(xj) = vj(xj)+
j−1X
k=1
(−1)k
X
1i1<<ik<j
vj(xj [
k\
s=1
Iis\Ij ]);
and vj(xj [
Tk
s=1 Iis \ Ij ])) = 0, if
Tk
s=1 Iis \ Ij = ;.
To compute a (unnormalized) subutility function vj(xj),
we have to know which local suboutcomes x0j are involved
(in the form xj [
Tk
s=1 Iis\Ij ]) on the right side of the equa-
tion; this amounts to finding all nonempty sets
Tk
s=1 Iis\Ij
and recording the corresponding sign of the local value
functions in Eq. 5. The structure of subutility functions de-
pends only on the GAI subset decomposition. Therefore,
given a GAI graph, we can use the following search proce-
dure to compute the relevant subsets needed to solve Eq. 5.
We only need to do this once for each subutility factor:
Input: GAI attribute sets I1; : : : ; Im.
Output: For each subutility factor j, a collection of sets Lj ,
and a sign function zj : Lj 7! f+1;−1g.
 For each subutility factor j:
 Start at node j and perform a graph search along the
directed arcs. The search depth is finite, so any search
algorithm (e.g., breadth-first or depth-first) could be
used. Set Lj = ;.
 While Ii \ Ij 6= ; (we’re at node i)
– let K = fnodes on path from j to ig;
– add \k2KIk to Lj ;
– set zj(\k2KIk) = 1, if depth even,
zj(\k2KIk) = -1, if depth odd.
Because of the graphical structure of GAI models, Eq. 5
now reduces to
vj(xj) =
X
J2Lj
zj(J) vj(xj [J ]):
Consider the example GAI graph in Figure 1. To com-
pute L5, we search for all non-empty intersections of
the set I5 with other sets. The only such sets are
I5 itself (at depth 0), I4 (depth 1), and I1 (depth 1).
Therefore, L5 = ff5; 6g; f5g; f6gg, and v5(x5; x6) =
v5(x5; x6)−v5(x5; x06)−v5(x05; x6). Finally, u5(x5; x6) =
v5(x5; x6)(u>5 − u?5 ).
4 Elicitation under Uncertainty
We now consider partial elicitation of utility parameters.
Generally speaking, good (or even optimal) decisions can
be realized without complete utility information. Rather
than asking for the direct assessment of utility parameters
using standard gambles as in [10], we consider simpler bi-
nary comparison queries over local gambles. Following
[6, 2], we suppose some prior over the parameters of a
GAI model, and use myopic expected value of information
(EVOI) to determine appropriate queries.
If a utility function u is completely unstructured, and a
prior density  over the utility function parameters is avail-
able, the best outcome with respect to the prior is simply
x = arg maxx E[u(x)]. However, we can query a user
about her utility function, update the prior based on the re-
sponse, and compute a new expected best outcome. If a
sequence of queries can be asked, finding the best elicita-
tion policy is a sequential decision process, providing an
optimal tradeoff between query costs (the burden of elic-
itation) and potentially better decisions due to additional
information [2]. However, such a policy is very difficult to
compute, so here we adopt a myopic approach to choosing
the next query [6].
We consider queries of the form “Is utility of outcome x
greater than l?”, denoted hxq; li; these require only yes; no
responses.6 The expected posterior utility (EPU) of query
hxq; li is
EPU(xq; l) =Pr(yesjxq; l) max
x
Eyesjx
q;l [u(x)]+
Pr(nojxq; l)max
x
Enojx
q;l [u(x)];
where Pr(yesjxq; l) is the probability of response yes
w.r.t. the current density and Eyesjxq;l is expectation w.r.t.
the updated density given a yes response. The expected
value of information of query hxq ; li is:
EVOI(xq; l) = EPU(xq; l)− E[u(x)]:
Therefore, the best myopic query is
hxq; li = arg max
xq
arg max
l
EPU(xq; l):
6The range of a utility function is assumed to be [0; 1].
This requires optimization over all outcomes in X, as well
as continuous optimization of the query point l 2 [0; 1].
4.1 GAI Structure and Local Queries
GAI models allow us take advantage of the additive utility
decomposition to compute EVOI. We assume that anchor
utilities u>1 ; u?1 ; : : : ; u>m; u?m are known, but the local value
functions v1; : : : ; vm are specified imprecisely via indepen-
dent priors over local value function parameters. Thus, for
each suboutcome xi (apart from three special configura-
tions x>i ;x?i ;x0i whose local values are fixed) we have an
independent prior density over possible values of vi(xi).7
The expected value of outcome x is then
E[u(x)] =
mX
j=1
E[uj(xj)] =
mX
j=1
(u>j − u?j )E[vj(xj)];
where E[vj(xj)] equals
E[vj(xj)] +
j−1X
k=1
(−1)k
X
1i1<<ik<j
E[vj(xj [
k\
s=1
Iis \ Ij ])]:
With priors over local utility functions, an appropriate
form of query is “Is local utility of suboutcome xi greater
than l?”, denoted as hxqi ; li. Such a query is a local query,
because it asks a user to focus on preferences over a (usu-
ally small) subset of attributes; the values of remaining at-
tributes do not have to be considered. Indeed, this corre-
sponds to a binary comparison query over local outcomes
and gambles, which a user can more easily assess: “do you
prefer xi or hp;x>i ; 1 − p;x?i i, assuming that attributes in
the conditioning set Ci are at default levels?” The best local
myopic query is then
hxqi ; li = arg max
x
q
i
arg max
l
Pr(yesjxqi ; l) max
x
Eyesjx
q
i ;l [u(x)]+
Pr(nojxqi ; l) max
x
Enojx
q
i ;l [u(x)]:
We can simplify part of the equation as follows:
max
x
Eyesjx
q
i ;l [u(x)]
= max
xi
2
4Eyesjxqi ;l [ui(xi)] + max
x restr. to xi
X
j 6=i
E[uj(xj)]
3
5
= max
xi
h
(u>i − u?i )Eyesjx
q
i ;l [vi(xi)] + r(xi)
i
;
where r(xi) = maxx restr. to xi
P
j 6=i E[uj(xj)] could be
computed by, say, variable elimination.
We need some additional notation. Let dep(x0j) be the set
of all suboutcomes xj such that x0j appears (in the form
xj [
Tk
s=1 Iis \ Ij ]) on the right side of an expression for
vj(xj) in Eq. 5.8 Intuitively, subutility values of outcomes
7Recall vi(x>i ) = 1; vi(x?i ) = 0; andvi(x0i ) =
u(x0)−u?i
u>i −u?i
.
8The set dep(x0j) can be computed easily from the set Lj ob-
tained by the GAI graph search procedure.
in dep(x0j) “depend” on the local utility of outcome x0j .
Also, let s(xj ;x0j) be the signed unit (i.e., +1 or -1) in front
of vj(x0j) on the right side of an equation for vj(xj).
If xi =2 dep(xqi ), then a query involving xqi will not
change the expected value of u(xi): Eyesjx
q
i ;l [ui(xi)] =
E[ui(xi)]. If xi 2 dep(xqi ), then the expected posterior
value of ui(xi) changes only because of the change in the
posterior expectation of vi(xqi ). Therefore, in such a case,
Eyesjx
q
i
;l [vi(xi)]
= E[vi(xi)]− s(xi;xqi )E[vi(xqi )] + s(xi;xqi ) Eyesjx
q
i
;l [vi(x
q
i )]
= s(xi;x
q
i ) E
yesjxqi ;l [vi(xqi )] + E[vi(xi)]− s(xi;xqi ) E[vi(xqi )]:
Thus,
max
x
Eyesjx
q
i ;l [u(x)]
= max
xi
h
Eyesjx
q
i ;l [ui(xi)] + r(xi)
i
= max
(
maxxi =2dep(xqi ) E[ui(xi)] + r(xi)
maxxi2dep(xqi ) E
yesjxqi ;l [ui(xi)] + r(xi)
= max
(
m
fd1(xi) +(l) + d2(xi) j xi 2 dep(xqi )g:
where
+(l) = Eyesjx
q
i
;l [vi(x
q
i )];
d1(xi) = (u
>
i − u?i )s(xi;xqi ); and d2(xi) =
(u>i − u?i )(E[vi(xi)]− s(xi;xqi )E[vi(xqi )]) + r(xi):
maxx Enojx
q
i ;l [u(x)] can be simplified in a similar way.
4.2 Mixture of uniforms priors
Specifying prior information over local utility parameters
as a mixture of uniform distributions confers several ad-
vantages for utility elicitation. With enough components,
a mixture of uniforms is flexible enough to approximate
many standard distributions; furthermore, it fits nicely with
the type of queries we consider here. Because the posterior
distribution after a response to a query remains a mixture
of uniforms (we only need to update the weights), it is pos-
sible to maintain an exact density over utility parameters
throughout the elicitation process [2]. Most importantly,
we can calculate the optimal query point l analytically. To
maximize EPU, we only need to calculate the maximum of(
Pr(yesjl) m + Pr(nojl) (d1(xi) −(l) + d2(xi))
Pr(yesjl) (d1(xi) +(l) + d2(xi)) + Pr(nojl) m
for each xi 2 dep(xqi ). For a given xi, this expression is a
piecewise quadratic function of l. Fig. 2 shows an example
of such a function for a density with 5 components. The
maximum occurs at l = m−d2(xi)d1(xi) , if l
 2 [0; 1].
5 Empirical Results
We implemented the myopic elicitation strategy using prior
densities specified as mixtures of uniform distributions, and
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Figure 2: Expected posterior utility as a function of the
query point l
tested it on a realistic car-rental problem [4]. The graphical
structure of this problem is sufficient to admit fast (around
1 second) EVOI computation; therefore, our approach can
readily support interactive real-time preference elicitation.
The car-rental problem is modeled with 26 variables that
specify various attributes of a car relevant to typical rental
decisions. Variable domains range from 2 to 9 values,
resulting in 61,917,364,224 possible configurations. The
GAI model consists of 13 local factors, each defined on at
most five variables; the model has 378 utility parameters
(see [4] for further problem details). Constraints on possi-
ble configurations require constraint-based optimization to
determine optimal feasible configurations of the variables
(so even with a precise utility function, optimization is re-
quired to determine the best outcome). We use variable
elimination to determine best “expected” outcomes.
We experiment with three different types of priors on local
utility functions: a (random) mixture of five uniforms, a
non-informative uniform density, and a mixture of 10 uni-
forms which is fitted to approximate a truncated Gaussian
distribution with a variance of 0.3 and the mean chosen
at random from the interval [0; 1]. For each of the three
types of priors, we sample 30 different utility functions
that are used to generate responses to queries. We then
run our elicitation algorithm for 100 queries; for an EVOI
query strategy, if the EVOI becomes 0 (which happens af-
ter 20-30 queries on average), we choose the next query
at random. We compare our myopic EVOI strategy with
a “random” query strategy, where a subutility factor and
a local query configuration is chosen at random; however,
the query point l is set to the expected local utility of the
query suboutcome (so l is chosen “intelligently” to give
equal odds to either response). Figure 3 summarizes our
experimental results for the three different types of priors.
All results for EVOI queries are averaged over 30 trials
with underlying utility functions sampled from the corre-
sponding priors, while the random strategy results are av-
eraged over 100 trials. Figure 3(b) show (unsurprisingly)
that Gaussian priors are quite informative—on average, the
initial error (before elicitation) is only slightly greater than
2%, while the uniform priors give an initial error is around
13%. The impact of these differences is normalized in Fig-
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Figure 3: Utility error reduction with queries: (a) as a percentage of the initial error; (b) as a percentage of the optimal
utility. EVOI query strategy results are unmarked, and random strategy results are marked with an ‘X’.
ure 3(a), which shows how the error decreases as a fraction
of the initial error. In all cases, the EVOI strategy is clearly
superior to a random query strategy, which at best reduces
the error by only 20% after 100 queries. The EVOI strategy
cuts the error by at least a half after 50 queries. Though this
might seem like a large number of queries, recall that the
problem is large (378 utility parameters), and our queries
are local comparison queries.
6 Concluding Remarks
We described a new approach to elicitation in GAI mod-
els. Unlike previous approaches, we have shown how the
graphical structure can be exploited to restrict attention al-
most exclusively to queries over local outcomes and local
standard gambles, thus extending a key advantage of ad-
ditive models to the generalized case. We have also shown
how one can exploit GAI structure to optimize query choice
when using myopic EVOI to guide preference elicitation.
A number of directions remains to be explored. Methods
for eliciting GAI model structure are of primary importance
because a suitable GAI decomposition is a prerequisite for
our algorithm [11]. Other directions include incorporating
noise models into user responses [2]; developing compu-
tationally tractable approximations for computing nonmy-
opic EVOI in this setting; user case studies and methods for
dealing with inconsistency in user responses (though our
current method will never ask a query for which a response
could be inconsistent); and investigating other decision cri-
teria such as minimax regret [4].
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